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I. T H E T O P I C A N D T H E C H A L L E N G E S 
On observing the international dispute settlement scene in recent years, one is 
intrigued by the fact that international courts and tribunals have increasingly been 
asked to rule on national court decisions relating to commercial arbitrations. These 
national decisions mainly deal with the enforcement of arbitration agreements or 
the annulment or enforcement of arbitral awards. They apply the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards1 
and/or national arbitration laws. The international courts and tribunals seized of 
claims involving these national court decisions are primarily investor-state arbitral 
tribunals2 and human rights courts,3 and, in one less recent instance, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).4 
The phenomenon is intriguing because it challenges traditional conceptions in 
at least two respects. First, it challenges the understanding of the overall 
architecture of international commercial arbitration. The term 'architecture' is 
borrowed from W. Michael Reisman, who has written extensively on the topic, 
Professor, University of Geneva School of Law; Director, Geneva LLM in International Dispute Settlement 
(MIDS); Partner, Levy Kaufmann-Kohler. The author thanks Dr Michele Potesta, Senior lecturer, MIDS, for 
his valuable assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1
 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 Jun. 1958, 330 UNTS 3 
(hereinafter New York Convention). 
2
 See the cases discussed infra at 11(b). 
3
 See the cases discussed infra at 11(a). 
4
 See Societe Commerciak de Belgique (Belg. v. Greece), 1939 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B) No. 78 (June 15). 
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including an article on some of the issues addressed in this contribution.5 In fact, 
the traditional and most widely accepted conception of the architecture of 
international commercial arbitration builds on the finality of arbitral awards, with 
courts at the seat of the arbitration (sometimes called courts of primary 
jurisdiction) being competent to annul awards and courts at the place of 
enforcement (courts of secondary jurisdiction) being competent to rule on the 
enforcement or non-enforcement of awards in that particular forum.6 This 
structure rests, above all, on the New York Convention as well as on national 
arbitration legislation. 
This traditional architecture is a closed one in the sense that there is no recourse 
against a final decision by the courts at the seat of the arbitration on the annulment 
of an award. Similarly, there is no recourse against the final decision of the courts 
at the place of enforcement. The New York Convention, which has no dispute 
resolution clause, is silent when it comes to determining what kind of remedy (if 
any) an aggrieved party may have in case of violation of the treaty by a contracting 
state's court. Does this new development, where domestic decisions concerning 
commercial arbitration are brought before international courts or tribunals open 
up this closed system? In other words, does this development point to a shift from 
the conception which traditionally assigns the last word to national courts (at the 
annulment or enforcement stage) towards a new role for international courts or 
tribunals called to exercise a sort of'super-supervisory' role over domestic courts' 
conduct relating to commercial arbitration?7 
The second and closely related question goes to the organization of 
international dispute settlement. At least in its current design, this organization 
appears considerably fragmented and far from a 'system' in the meaning of a set of 
interdependent or interacting components forming an integrated whole.8 Despite 
undeniable, yet marginal, interactions among these components,9 different types of 
disputes - investment, trade, commercial, human rights disputes — are each 
referred to special dispute resolution mechanisms, investment arbitration, the 
dispute resolution system of the World Trade Organization, international 
See W. Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of National Courts and International Commercial 
Arbitration, 21 Am. Rev. Intl. Arb. 5 (2010); W. Michael Reisman, Investment and Human Rights Tribunals as Courts 
of Last Appeal in International Commercial Arbitration, in LIBER AMCORUM EN L'HONNEUR DE SERGE LAZAREFT 521 
(Laurent Levy & Yves Derains, eds., 2011); W. Michael Reisman & Brian Richardson, Tribunals and Courts: An 
Interpretation of the Architecture of International Commercial Arbitration, Draft circulated at ICCA Geneva 2011 (on file 
with the author). 
There are, of course, other schools of thought on the architecture of international arbitration. These will not 
be further taken into account here, because they are not reflective of the generally accepted conceptions of 
international arbitration. One of those school of thoughts is the French theory on the existence of an arbitral 
order, which found its most elaborate expression in Emmanuel Gaillard's recent writings. See, e.g., Emmanuel 
Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration (2010). 
Or 'supervisory-supervisory' in the terms of W. Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of 
National Courts and International Commercial Arbitration, 21 Am. Rev. Intl. Arb. 5, 36-44 (2010). 
See in particular, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L'unite de I'ordre juridique international, 297 Recueil des cours (2002), esp. 
460-478. 
For instance, investment tribunals repeatedly cite jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, or 
human right issues come up in any type of dispute settlement. 
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commercial arbitration and regional human rights courts. Does the fact that 
domestic decisions on commercial arbitration are now brought before 
international courts and tribunals build bridges among the components of this 
fragmented system? Does it work towards defragmentation or integration of the 
system? 
Having set out the main challenges which these recent developments pose, this 
article will first briefly discuss certain cases where the intersection between a 
commercial arbitration dispute and a different dispute settlement mechanism may 
be observed (II). In this context, it will first look at cases brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights (II.(a)) and before investment tribunals (II.(b)). 
In each domain, certain cases will exemplify possible scenarios and relevant issues. 
The unique case before the PCIJ will also be briefly analysed (II.(c)). The following 
part of this contribution then discusses, more particularly, one of the dispute 
settlement mechanisms where intersection can be increasingly observed, namely 
investment arbitration (III). The recourse to investment arbitration as a platform to 
resolve issues arising out of national court decisions on commercial arbitrations 
raises several questions, relating both to the jurisdiction of investment tribunals 
(III.(a)) as well as the merits of these claims (III.(b)). This contribution then draws 
some Conclusions (IV). 
II. T Y P O L O G Y O F C O M M E R C I A L A R B I T R A T I O N 
ISSUES B R O U G H T B E F O R E I N T E R N A T I O N A L 
C O U R T S A N D T R I B U N A L S 
The best way of understanding the extent to which a court decision may be 
brought before an international dispute settlement mechanism is to refer to 
concrete examples that have emerged till date. 
(a) Kin-Stib v. Serbia (Gambling in Belgrade) 
In the late 1980s, Kin-Stib, a Congolese company, entered into a joint venture with 
a Serbian state-owned agency for the establishment and operation of a casino in a 
state-owned hotel in Belgrade. The casino opened in 1990 and closed three years 
later as a result of financial difficulties. Kin-Stib initiated domestic arbitration 
seeking repossession of the casino and compensation for breach of contract. It 
obtained an award in its favour. Serbia complied with the payment obligations, but 
not with the repossession. As the hotel owner was bankrupt, the repossession was 
transformed into a money award under local enforcement laws. However, in spite 
of enforcement procedures, the money award remained unpaid. Exactly ten years 
after the initiation of the arbitration, Kin-Stib decided to file an application before 
the European Court of Human Rights seeking an order for payment of the 
outstanding part of the arbitral award.10 The application was based on Article 1(1) 
Case of Kin-Stib and Majkic v. Serbia (Application no. 12312/05), Judgment, 20 Apr. 2010 (Kin-Stib). See also 
Yaraslau Kryvoi, Introductory Note to European Court of Human Rights: Kin-Stib & Majkic v. Serbia, 49 Intl. Leg. 
Materials 1183(2010). 
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of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which 
guarantees the peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions.11 
The European Court of Human Rights held that a claim - including a claim 
arising out of an arbitral award - can constitute a possession under Protocol No. 1 
'if it is sufficiently established to be enforceable'.12 It observed that a State had a 
'responsibility to make use of all available legal means at its disposal in order to 
enforce a binding arbitration award'.13 It then found that the Serbian authorities 
had not taken all necessary steps to enforce the award and held that such failure 
was a violation of Protocol No. I.14 Consequently, it made an order for payment of 
the outstanding amounts under the arbitral award.15 
In holding that a claim arising out of an arbitral award may constitute a 
'possession' under Protocol No. 1, the Court confirmed its earlier case law. In 
particular, relied on Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece.16 There, the Court held that a 
state could not pass a law which had the effect of voiding an arbitration 
agreement.17 It recalled the principle of the separability of an arbitration clause,18 
relied on a PCIJ precedent (as well as the Lena Goldfields and Texaco arbitral awards), 
and held that 'the unilateral termination of a contract does not take effect in 
relation to certain essential clauses of the contract, such as the arbitration clause. 
To alter the machinery set up by enacting an authoritative amendment to such a 
clause would make it possible for one of the parties to evade jurisdiction in a 
dispute in respect of which specific provision was made for arbitration'.19 
Incidentally, and subject to there being a BIT in force, Kin-Stib could also have started an investment 
arbitration. It was a foreigner and had made an investment in the host state, which investment gave rise to 
a claim. This shows that human rights claims can, in certain cases, be an alternative to an investment 
arbitration. See in particular Ursula Kriebaum, Is the European Court of Human Rights an Alternative to Investor-State 
Arbitration? in Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration 219-245 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. 
eds., 2009); Ursula Kriebaum, Privatizing Human Rights. The Interface between International Investment Protection and 
Human Rights, in The Law of International Relations - liber Amicorum Hanspeter JVeuhold 165-189 (August Reinisch 
& Ursula Kriebaum eds., Eleven International Publishing, 2007). 
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 Ibid., paras. 81-85. 
15
 Although the dispute was international in nature because of the foreign nationality of Kin-Stib, the award 
was made in Serbia. Consequently, it did not fall under the ambit of the New York Convention. Thus, Serbia 
was blamed for the non-enforcement of a domestic (rather than foreign), award. This, however, does not 
affect the relevance of the case for the present discussion, because it deals with a court's misbehaviour 
relating to an arbitration which was, in essence, international. 
Case of Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis ». Greece (Application no. 13427/87), Judgment, 9 Dec. 1994 
(Stran Greek). 
See in particular, ibid., paras. 59—62. The Court made the following observations: 'The Court agrees with the 
Government that it is not its task to approve or disapprove the substance of [the arbitral] award. It is, 
however, under a duty to take note of the legal position established by that decision in relation to the parties. 
According to its wording, the award was final and binding; it did not require any further enforcement 
measure and no ordinary or special appeal lay against it. [. . . ] Accordingly, in the Court's view, [the right 
arising out of the award] constituted a "possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1'. Ibid., 
paras. 61-62. This passage was quoted with approval by the Court in Kin-Stib, supra n. 9, at para. 83, as well 
as by the Arbitral Tribunal in Saipem (on which see infra, at II.(b)(iii)) in its Decision on Jurisdiction, at para. 
103. 
Stran-Greek, para. 73. 
19
 Ibid., para. 72. For a similar constellation, see Case of Regent Company v. Ukraine (Application no. 773, 03), 
Judgment, 3 Apr. 2008 (dealing with non-enforcement of an arbitral award rendered by the International 
Commercial Arbitration Before International Courts and Tribunals 157 
(b) ATA v. Jordan (Death and Rebirth of an Agreement to Arbitrate) 
While Kin-Stib provides an example of a human rights court dealing with the 
non-enforcement of a commercial arbitration award, ATA v. Jordan exemplifies a 
similar role played by an investment tribunal. 
ATA, a Turkish consortium, entered into a construction contract with a 
Jordanian state entity.20 A dispute arose after a dike built by the consortium broke. 
An arbitration under the contract in Amman resulted in an award in favour of 
ATA. The Jordanian entity filed an annulment action before ajordanian court i.e., 
the court at the seat of the arbitration having primary jurisdiction. The court 
annulled the award on the ground that the arbitral tribunal failed to apply the law 
chosen by the parties.21 The court also declared the 'extinguishment' — or the death 
— of the arbitration agreement based on a provision of Jordanian law under which 
'the final decision nullifying the award results in extinguishing the arbitration 
agreement'.22 Pertinently, this provision was introduced into the Jordanian 
legislation after the conclusion of the construction contract embodying the 
arbitration clause. The outcome of the court decision implied that the dispute had 
to be re-litigated in court. Accordingly, the Jordanian entity started a new action on 
the merits in the local courts.23 Rather than defending the action in the local 
courts, ATA began an arbitration under the Jordan-Turkey bilateral investment 
treaty (BIT) at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). It claimed that the annulment of the arbitral award and the 
extinguishment of the arbitration agreement breached the standards of protection 
contained in the BIT. 
The ICSID tribunal denied jurisdiction on the issue of annulment for ratione 
temporis reasons, which are of no interest here.24 In contrast, it accepted jurisdiction 
over the extinguishment claim. Surprisingly, without entering into a separate 
examination of the requirements of an investment under Article 25 of the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), the tribunal considered that the 
arbitration agreement constituted an 'investment' under the BIT.25 On the merits, 
Commercial Arbitration Court at the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The Court found 
that Ukraine had violated Article 6(1) ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1). See also Sabine Konrad & 
Marcus Birch, Non-Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Only a Pyrrhic Victory? 7 Transnatl. Dispute Mgt. (2010). 
ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2, Award, 18 May 2010 
(ATA). All decisions in investment arbitration cases are available, unless otherwise indicated, at http:// 
italaw.com. 
Ibid., paras. 46-54. 
Ibid., para. 54. See Art. 51 of the Jordanian Arbitration Law (Law no. 31 of 2001), quoted at para. 62 of the 
award, provides in its final sentence that: 'The final decision nullifying the award results in extinguishing the 
arbitration agreement'. 
Ibid., para. 55. 
Ibid., paras. 94-103. 
Ibid., paras. 110-120. The reasoning of the Tribunal is not entirely clear in this regard. The Tribunal first 
cited to Saipem (on which see infra at II.(b)(iii)) for the proposition that 'the Final Award at issue in the present 
arbitration would be part of an "entire operation" that qualifies as an investment' (ibid., para. 115). Then, 
turning to the extinguishment claim, it analysed whether the right to arbitration was an 'investment' within 
the meaning of the BIT, which in its definition of 'investment' comprises 'claims to . . . any other rights to 
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the reasoning hinged on the retroactivity of the law providing for the 
extinguishment of the arbitration agreement. The tribunal concluded that if the 
law had existed when the parties entered into the arbitration agreement (i.e., when 
the parties chose the seat of the arbitration), then it may have been compatible 
with Article II of the New York Convention.26 However, as the law did not exist at 
the time the parties entered into the arbitration agreement, its retroactive 
application resulted in a breach of the BIT.27 The tribunal did not specify which 
BIT standard was breached. Granting a drastic relief, the tribunal ordered the 
'restoration of the right to arbitrate' i.e., the re-birth of the arbitration clause, and 
the cessation of all local judicial proceedings.28 
(c) Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic (Limits of the Public Policy Exception) 
The preceding example dealt with an investment tribunal ruling on a national 
court decision on the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. This case involves an 
investment tribunal ruling on a national court decision on the enforceability of an 
arbitral award. 
Here, a Canadian investor had entered into a joint venture with a Czech entity 
to invest in the aviation industry in the Czech Republic, and, in particular, to take 
over an insolvent aircraft manufacturer.29 A dispute arose concerning the 
performance of the joint venture. Frontier initiated arbitration under the contract 
in Stockholm. Meanwhile, the Czech entity as well as the joint venture company 
were declared bankrupt. An award was issued in favour of Frontier in the 
Stockholm arbitration. Among other remedies, Frontier was granted a secured lien 
on all assets of the Czech entity and the joint venture company. The Czech courts 
refused enforcement of the award on the ground of public policy under the New 
York Convention. According to them, enforcement of the award would entail 
giving Frontier priority over the other creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings. 
This would breach the principle of equal treatment of creditors, a principle 
considered to be part of Czech international public policy under Article V(2)(b) of 
the New York Convention. 
Following the refusal of enforcement, Frontier commenced an UNCITRAL 
investment arbitration under the Canada-Czechoslovakia BIT. It claimed that by 
legitimate performance having financial value related to an investment' (ibid., para. 117). The Tribunal found 
that '[t]he right to arbitration could hardly be considered as something other than a "right.. . to legitimate 
performance having financial value related to an investment'" (ibid.). On the characterization of an 
arbitration agreement as an investment, see infra at III.(a)(b). 
Ibid., para. 128 (noting that '[i]t is arguable (but the Tribunal takes no position on the point) that the 
extinguishment rule might be deemed to be prospectively compatible with Article II insofar as parties 
electing Jordan as the venue for an arbitration or electing Jordanian law as the law of the arbitration had 
notice of the rule and accepted it.' 
Ibid., para. 128. See also ibid., para. 121 (where 'the Tribunal finds that the extinguishment of the Claimant's 
right to arbitration by application of the last sentence of the 2001 Jordanian Arbitration Law was contrary 
to the Turkey-Jordan BIT.'). 
Ibid., para. 131 and para. 133 for the dispositif. 
Frontier Petroleum Services Ltd v. Czech Republic, PCA/UNCITRAL, Final Award, 12 Nov. 2010 (Frontier), at 
Oxford Rep. Intl. Inv. Claims [IIC] 465 (2010). 
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refusing to enforce the arbitral award, the Czech Republic had breached the fair 
and equitable treatment standard contained in the Treaty. After finding that there 
was an 'investment' for the purpose of jurisdiction (by reference to the initial 
contribution in cash into the joint venture),30 the tribunal dismissed the 
respondent's argument that the arbitral tribunal lacked power to review a national 
court's decision rendered under the New York Convention. It considered that its 
role was 'to determine whether the refusal of the Czech courts to recognize and 
enforce the Final Award in full violate[d] Article III (1) of the BIT, i.e., the fair and 
equitable treatment standard'.31 It went on to say that 'in order to answer this 
question the tribunal must ask whether the Czech courts' refusal amounts to an 
abuse of rights contrary to the international principle of good faith'.32 Recognizing 
that '[sjtates enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in determining what their own 
conception of international public policy is'33 the question, in the tribunal's view, 
was whether 'the decision by the Czech courts [was] reasonably tenable and made in 
good faith'?* The Frontier tribunal found that other national courts as well as 
scholars deemed the equal treatment of creditors to be part of international public 
policy under the New York Convention.35 Accordingly, it concluded that the 
decision of the Czech courts was tenable. 
(d) . . . And Others 
ATA and Frontier are just two illustrations of investment arbitration tribunals 
dealing with the enforcement of a commercial arbitration agreement and with an 
award. The last few years have seen several other cases raising similar issues. It is 
worth mentioning them here. 
Saipem v. Bangladesh involved the conduct of domestic courts relating to an 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration seated in the respondent's 
capital, Dhaka.36 During the ICC arbitration, the Bangladeshi courts intervened 
in several different ways, including issuing an injunction restraining Saipem from 
continuing with the ICC arbitration and by revoking the authority of the ICC 
tribunal. Once the ICC tribunal rendered its award, the courts ruled that there 
30
 Ibid., para. 231. The Tribunal noted that 'by refusing to recognize and enforce the Final Award in its entirety, 
the Tribunal accepts that Respondent could be said to have affected the management, use, enjoyment, or 
disposal by Claimant of what remained of its original investment.' (ibid., emphasis added) 
31




 Ibid., para. 527. 
34
 Ibid, (emphasis in the original). 
35
 Ibid., paras. 528-530. 
36
 Saipem S.pA. v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on 
Provisional Measures, 21 Mar. 2007 (Saipem Jurisdiction); and Award, 30Jun. 2009 (Saipem Merits). The author 
of this contribution was the President of the ICSID tribunal. For commentaries on Saipem, see Luca G. 
Radicati di Brozolo & Loretta Malintoppi, Unlawful interference with International Arbitration by National Courts of the 
Seat in the Aftermath of Saipem v. Bangladesh, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 993 (M. A. Femandez-
Ballesteros & David Arias eds., 2010); Alexis Mourre & Alexandre Vagenheim, Some Comments on Denial of 
Justice in Public and Private International Law After Laewen and Saipem, in LIBER AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES 843 
(M. A. Fernandez-Ballesteros & David Arias eds., 2010). 
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'was no award in the eye of the law' which could either be set aside or enforced.37 
Saipem then initiated ICSID proceedings, by invoking the dispute resolution 
clause in the Italy-Bangladesh BIT.38 The ICSID tribunal found that the investor's 
'residual contractual rights under the investment as crystallized in the ICC award' 
constituted a property right that was susceptible of expropriation.39 It held that the 
Bangladeshi courts had taken measures amounting to unlawful expropriation.40 
The measures also constituted an abuse of rights under international law41 and 
breached the New York Convention.42 
GEA v. Ukraine addressed a scenario of non-enforcement of an ICC award by the 
host states' courts.43 Before an ICSID tribunal, the claimant argued that the 
Ukrainian courts had 'rendered a "travesty of justice in applying a discriminatory 
law to avoid enforcement of GEA's Award under the New York Convention", such 
that "their refusal to recognize GEA's ICC Award [was] tantamount to an 
expropriation'"44. The ICC arbitration (and consequent award) arose from a 
'settlement agreement' and a 'repayment agreement', neither of which the ICSID 
Tribunal held sufficient to constitute an 'investment' for the purpose of its 
jurisdiction.45 The Tribunal was also of the opinion that the ICC award 'in and of 
itself could not be deemed an investment.46 However, the Tribunal continued, 
even if, arguendo, the award was considered an 'investment', there was no reason to 
believe that the courts had applied a discriminatory law or that their actions were 
'egregious' in any way.47 Thus, even if jurisdiction had been established, the case 
was bound to fail on the merits. 
Romak v. Uzbekistan dealt with a somewhat similar situation.48 Here too, an 
investment arbitration tribunal (deriving its authority from the Switzerland-
Uzbekistan BIT, operating under the UNCITRAL Rules) was faced with a 
commercial award in favour of the claimant, which could not be enforced in the 
host state. The Claimant argued that for purposes of jurisdiction it was sufficient to 
verify that the commercial award (rendered under the auspices of the Grain and 
Free Trade Association (GAFTA)) fell within the very broad definition of 
'investment' contained in Article 1 of the BIT The tribunal refused to follow this 
argument. Instead, it observed that the term 'investment' had an 'inherent' 
meaning. In effect, the Tribunal resorted to the criteria that ICSID jurisprudence 
Saipem Jurisdiction, paras. 26—36. 
Article 9 of the Italy-Bangladesh BIT offers ICSID arbitration as a venue for the resolution of disputes 
'relating to compensation for expropriation, nationalization, requisition or similar measures'. See Saipem 
Jurisdiction, para. 70. 
Saipem Merits, para. 128. 
Ibid., paras. 129, 133, 201-202. 
Ibid., paras. 160-161. 
Ibid., paras. 167-168, 170. 
GEA Group Aktiengeselkchaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, 31 Mar. 2011 (GEA). 
Ibid., para. 227 (internal footnote omitted). 
Ibid., para. 157. 
Ibid., para. 161. 
Ibid., para. 236 (in relation to the expropriation claim) and paras. 314—319 (in relation to the fair and 
equitable treatment claim). 
Romak SA v. Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA No. AA280, UNCITRAL, Award (26 Nov. 2009) (Romak). 
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has identified while defining the term 'investment' under Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention. It found that the underlying transaction causing the GAFTA 
arbitration (a contract for the supply of goods) could not be considered as an 
'investment' (in terms of an economic operation entailing a contribution, a certain 
duration, and a risk). Consequently, the Tribunal declined jurisdiction.49 The 
tribunal thus had no opportunity to decide whether the Uzbek courts' conduct 
relating to the GAFTA award constituted a violation of the BIT. 
The UNCITRAL award in White Industries v. India provides the most recent 
example of an investment tribunal's review of a decision of national courts relating 
to a commercial arbitration award.50 The case arose out of a dispute between a 
Australian mining company and Coal India, a state-owned entity. The dispute was 
resolved through an ICC arbitration seated in Paris. The arbitration resulted in an 
award in favour of White Industries, which sought enforcement in India. 
Surprisingly, Coal India responded by filing an application to set aside the award 
before the Indian courts (although the seat of the arbitration was Paris). 
After nine years of complex litigation involving enforcement and setting aside 
proceedings (none of which resulted in a determination), White Industries initiated 
an investment arbitration invoking the Australia-India BIT.51 It claimed, inter alia, 
that its investment had been expropriated, that it had been treated unfairly and 
inequitably, that it had suffered a denial of justice and that it had not been 
provided 'effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights' (a standard not 
included in the basic treaty, but which the claimant sought to incorporate through 
operation of the most-favoured nation clause contained in the basic treaty).52 
While the tribunal rejected the allegations of expropriation,53 fair and equitable 
treatment54 and denial of justice,55 it found that the duration of the enforcement 
proceedings (which included more than five years on the docket of the Supreme 
Court) amounted to a breach of India's obligation to provide 'effective means of 
asserting claims and enforcing rights'.56 
Finally, a few other investment arbitration cases have involved commercial 
arbitrations, but are less relevant to our discussion, either because of their unique 
fact patterns57 or because they were setded before a decision.58 
See in particular, ibid., para. 211. 
White Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 30 Nov. 201 \{White Industries). 
Ibid., paras. 3.2.1-3.2.65. 
Ibid., paras. 4.1.1-4.7.2. 
Ibid., Section 12. 
Ibid., paras. 10.1-10.3. 
Ibid., Section 10.4. 
See in particular ibid., Section 11. 
See Desert Line Projects LLC v. Temen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award 6 Feb. 2008, involving a claim that 
the investor had signed a settlement agreement that overturned a previous domestic arbitral award under 
duress. The case involves no alleged misbehaviour by domestic courts. See ibid., para. 202. 
See Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/2 (case discontinued, see Order of 16 
Mar. 2006). 
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(e) The Socobelge Case (Greek Debt Issues before the International Court of Justice) 
The European Court of Human Rights and investment arbitral tribunals seem the 
preferredTora for cases involving court decisions relating to commercial arbitration. 
However, it should not be overlooked that instead of seizing a court or tribunal 
where it can confront the disputing state directly, an aggrieved party could also 
seek diplomatic espousal by its home Government. A dispute relating to 
commercial arbitration could also be resolved by way of an inter-state dispute 
setdement mechanism for which the relevant jurisdictional requirements (inprimis, 
consent to that dispute settlement method) could be established. This possibility is 
illustrated by Socobelge v. Greece, a case decided in 1939 by the PCIJ, the predecessor 
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the aftermath of the Great 
Depression.59 At a time when several sovereign states - including Greece - are 
facing default risks and when the competence of international courts and tribunals 
to deal with sovereign debt restructuring issues has come under close scrutiny,60 
the case makes instructive reading and may well foreshadow difficulties to come. 
In 1925, the Belgian Societe Commerciale de Belgique (Socobelge) entered into 
a contract with the Greek government for the construction of a railway. The works 
were to be financed by a loan from Socobelge, which the Government was to cover 
by issuing bonds. Payments on the bonds were to be made to Socobelge on 
completion of certain milestones. In 1932, while the construction was ongoing, 
Greece defaulted on its debt and thus stopped paying Socobelge. The latter in turn 
became unable to pay its sub-contractors and the works were suspended. 
The following year, Socobelge started an arbitration under the construction 
contract and eventually obtained an award in its favour. The award terminated the 
contract and awarded Socobelge compensation of around USD 7 million. When 
Greece refused to pay on the ground that the award was part of its sovereign debt 
and that payment arrangements for the debts were being negotiated, Socobelge 
sought diplomatic protection from its home Government. Belgium filed an 
application before the PCIJ seeking a declaration that Greece had breached its 
international obligations by failing to satisfy a final arbitral award.61 
The Court first addressed the issue of how it should deal with an arbitral award 
resulting from an arbitration agreement which provided that the award would be 
'final and without appeal': 
Since the arbitral awards to which these submissions relate are, according to the arbitration clause 
under which they were made, 'final and without appeal', and since the Court has received no 
mandate from the Parties in regard to diem, it can neither confirm nor annul them either wholly 
or in part.62 
Societe Commerciale de Belgique (Belg. v. Greece), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78 (June 15) ('Socobelge'), 
See, e.g., the recent decision involving bondholders in Abaclat et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. A R B / 0 7 / 5 , 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 Aug. 2011, and Dissenting Opinion, 28 Oct. 2011. 
Socobelge, at 160-172. For a detailed comment on the decision, see in particular W. Michael Reisman, The 
Supervisory Jurisdiction of The International Court of Justice: International Arbitration and International Adjudication, 258 
Recueildes cours (1997), esp. 233-253. 
Socobelge, at 174. 
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The parties appeared to agree on several issues in their submissions. The Court 
seemed unwilling to go beyond these agreements. After stating that a settlement by 
the two disputing states was 'highly desirable',63 the Court, in the dispositive part of 
its judgment, merely held that the arbitral awards at issue were 'definitive and 
obligatory', an issue - the Court emphasized - on which the parties had agreed.64 
The decision shows a considerable degree of caution in dealing with the review 
of a final and binding commercial award, which may, in part, have been due to the 
delicate debt situation of Greece in which the League of Nations had also been 
involved.65 For the present purposes, the case also shows that a matter relating to 
a commercial arbitration may end up before an inter-state dispute settlement body. 
III. INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AS A F O R U M F OR 
T H E ADJUDICATION OF ABUSES RELATING T O 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION - DIFFICULTIES A N D 
IMPLICATIONS 
The cases analysed under the previous sections show that investor-state arbitration 
(under ICSID or other arbitration rules, such as UNCITRAL) is increasingly 
being resorted to as a forum for adjudication of disputes arising out of domestic 
courts' 'misconduct' relating to commercial arbitration.66 The choice of 
investment arbitration for these particular disputes raises distinct legal issues 
concerning both jurisdiction of investor-state arbitral tribunals to hear such 
disputes (HI. 1) and matters to be addressed on the merits (III. 2). 
(a) Questions of Jurisdiction 
As the unfolding of investment cases reveals, objections to the tribunal's 
jurisdiction will likely turn on two main issues. The first relates to the question of 
whether jurisdiction exists over claims involving the application of the New York 
Convention (1.1). The second deals with the issue of whether an arbitral award or 
an arbitration agreement constitute an investment for the purpose of the relevant 
BIT (as well as of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, if applicable) (1.2). 
The final sentence of the judgment, before the dispositif, reads: ' [ . . . ] the two Governments are, in principle, 
agreed in contemplating the possibility of negotiations with a view to a friendly settlement, in which regard 
would be had, amongst other things, to Greece's capacity to pay. Such a settlement is highly desirable.' Ibid., 
at 178. 
'The Court [•••] , noting the agreement between the Parties, states that the arbitral awards made on 
January 3rd and July 25th, 1936, between the Greek Government and the Societe commercial de Belgique are 
definitive and obligatory.' Ibid., at 178. 
See W. Michael Reisman, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of The International Court of Justice: International Arbitration and 
International Adjudication, 258 Recueil des cours (1997), at 238. 
Questions of attribution are generally not an issue in this constellation of cases, since the judiciary is 
considered an organ of the state (see Art. 4 of the International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts). On state responsibility for conduct of domestic courts, see 
Christopher Greenwood, State Responsibility for the Decisions of National Courts, in Issues of State Responsibility before 
Judicial Institutions 55 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Dan Sarooshi eds., Hart Publishing, 2004). 
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(i) Jurisdiction of Investment Tribunals to Review Decisions of National Courts Applying 
the New York Convention 
A first fundamental question addresses the role of investment tribunals in 
reviewing national court decisions applying the New York Convention. This 
question concerns mainly those cases where the investor's claim arises out of a 
failure by the domestic courts to enforce the arbitral award (rather than out of a 
court's annulment action, which is grounded on local law).67 
In Frontier, the respondent argued that if the investment tribunal decided to 
entertain the claim concerning the non-enforcement of the ICC award, it: 
would be acting as a court of appeal in respect of a decision of the Czech courts or as an 
international court with supervisory jurisdiction over contracting states' obligations under the 
New York Convention. Respondent observes that the drafters of the New York Convention gave 
the final word to the national competent authorities on die issue of public policy as a bar to 
recognition and enforcement.68 
Similarly, in GEA, the respondent's argument was that: 
a finding that 'a domestic court's refusal to recognise and enforce an arbitral award under the 
New York Convention' constitutes an expropriation under international law would create an 
appellate jurisdiction for die recognition and enforcement of awards, which 'would undermine the 
present international legal system for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.'69 
These arguments are not convincing because an investment tribunal is called to 
rule on allegations of treaty breaches by a state. If the jurisdictional requirements 
provided in the relevant BIT (and the ICSID Convention, if applicable) are met, 
the tribunal is bound to exercise its jurisdiction. There is no reason why it should 
not entertain a claim simply because the circumstances under which the alleged 
breach occurred involve the application of another treaty (i.e., the New York 
Convention). The investment tribunal is not arrogating the role of an enforcement 
court in addition to or in replacement of a national court; it is called to assess 
whether a state's conduct amounts to a violation of the applicable BIT.70 
The New York Convention's main object is the 'recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards'. This is not 
to say that the Convention is completely silent on the issue of annulment of awards. To the contrary, a plain 
reading of Art. V(l)(e) of the Convention requires actions to annul an international arbitral award be brought 
only in the place where the award was made (i.e., at the seat of the arbitration) or in the state whose 
procedural law is selected by the parties to govern the arbitration (although this is a rather theoretical 
situation). See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration 1260 (2009). In so doing, the Convention ensures 
that courts other than the courts at the seat may not purport to annul an international award. Ibid. It is the 
majority view, though, that the Convention does not limit the grounds under local law under which a 
competent court may annul an arbitral award. See ibid., pp. 2556-2560 (also discussing possible implied 
limits imposed by the New York Convention on the grounds to annul awards). 
Frontier, para. 485 (emphasis in the original, internal footnotes omitted). 
GEA, para. 230 (internal footnotes omitted). 
See for example the findings in Frontier, para. 525 ( ' [ . . . ] the Tribunal rejects Respondent's argument that 
this Tribunal does not have the power to review the decision of a national court's conception of the public 
policy exception under the New Tork Convention. The Tribunal's role under this claim is to determine whether 
the refusal of the Czech courts to recognise and enforce the Final Award in full violates Article 111(1) of the 
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Yet, an argument similar to the one advanced by the respondent in Frontier and 
GEA prevailed in Kaliningrad v. Lithuania, an ICC investment arbitration held in 
Paris under the Lithuania-Russia BIT.71 There a Cypriot company enforced in 
Lithuania a commercial arbitration award rendered in its favour against the 
Russian Region of Kaliningrad under the auspices of the London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA). The Lithuanian courts (including the Lithuanian 
Court of Cassation) allowed enforcement of the LCIA award by freezing and 
selling assets belonging to Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad invoked the investor-state 
dispute resolution clause in the Russia-Lithuania BIT and argued that the conduct 
of the Lithuanian courts constituted an unlawful expropriation. The fact pattern of 
the case is highly unusual with a 'reverse' scenario in comparison to the investment 
cases analysed above {Frontier, GEA, White Industries). Indeed, the claimant in the 
investment treaty arbitration was protesting the enforcement of the LCIA arbitral 
award, not its non-enforcement. 
The investment arbitration tribunal declined jurisdiction on the ground that to 
do otherwise would imply that it assumed the role of an appellate body 
scrutinizing the correctness of domestic decisions applying the New York 
Convention.72 This view apparently relied on the tribunal's belief that the New 
York Convention provided exclusive jurisdiction to the courts at the place of 
enforcement for all enforcement issues, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of any 
other court or tribunal on these issues. 
There is an obvious difficulty with this reasoning. Indeed, by adopting this view, 
the tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction under the BIT. While the unique facts 
of the case (i.e., a complaint of enforcement of an arbitral award rather than of 
non-enforcement) may, at least in part, account for the outcome, it cannot be ruled 
out a priori that a decision by a court granting enforcement, rather than denying it, 
may, in certain circumstances, be found to constitute a breach of an investment 
treaty.73 Conceptually, one can see no reason for distinguishing between 
enforcement and non-enforcement and thus for reaching a different solution based 
on that distinction. 
BIT,' emphasis in the original); and Saipem Jurisdiction, para. 156 ('By accepting jurisdiction, this Tribunal does 
not institute itself as control body over the ICC Arbitration, nor as enforcement court, nor as supranational 
appellate body for local court decisions. This Tribunal is a treaty judge. It is called upon to rule exclusively 
on treaty breaches, whatever the context in which such treaty breaches arise'). 
Government of the Kaliningrad Region v. Republic of Lithuania, ICC Arbitration, Final Award, 28 Jan. 2009 
(Kaliningrad) (unpublished). The reasoning and certain excerpts of the award emerge from the Paris Court of 
Appeals decision of 18 Nov. 2010, rejecting the annulment application of the ICC award. See Government of 
the Kaliningrad Region v. Republic of Lithuania, Paris Court of Appeals, Decision of 18 Nov. 2010 (available at 
http://italaw.com). 
Government of the Kaliningrad Region v. Republic of Lithuania, Paris Court of Appeals, Decision of 18 Nov. 2010, p. 3. 
For example, one could think of a case where a court at the enforcement stage allows, under the New York 
Convention, the enforcement of an award which is so patently wrongful or defective that any reasonable 
court would have refused enforcement. There appears to be no reason for a treaty tribunal, in a case such as 
this (provided the treaty jurisdictional requirements are met), not to exercise jurisdiction and to assess, on the 
merits, whether the court's conduct amounts to a violation of the applicable investment treaty. 
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The prospect that an investment treaty tribunal may have to apply the New 
York Convention as an 'enforcement court', which (mis)guided the Kaliningrad 
tribunal, is illustrated by White Industries. Concluding that the conduct of the Indian 
courts constituted a breach of the relevant BIT, the arbitral tribunal had to assess 
the damage caused by such breach.74 India argued that no compensation was due 
because White Industries had not established that the award would have been 
enforced had the award come up for enforcement.75 To determine compensation, 
therefore, the tribunal had to first review whether 'the [ICC] Award [was] 
enforceable under the laws of India'.76 It was careful to point out that, at the 
hearing, the parties had agreed to such review.77 The tribunal thus proceeded to 
examine each of the grounds for refusal of enforcement invoked by the Indian 
party before the domestic courts. It examined whether the ICC arbitral tribunal 
was biased,78 whether it had exceeded its jurisdiction,79 whether the award 
rendered was not in accordance with the arbitral procedure agreed by the 
parties,80 and finally whether it was against India's public policy.81 The tribunal 
found that none of these grounds could be upheld and concluded that 'the Award 
[was] enforceable under the laws of India'.82 
While such a review is an indispensable part of the analysis of the entitlement to 
compensation (if the award had not been enforceable, there would have been no 
loss) and sometimes also of the very existence of a treaty breach, it must remain 
within the confines of the application of the investment treaty. In White Industries, 
the tribunal did not and could not declare the award enforceable in India in lieu of 
the Indian courts. For purposes of enforcement in India, the latter could still refuse 
enforcement in spite of the contrary ICSID decision. 
(ii) Is an Arbitral Award or an Arbitration Agreement an Investment? 
The second issue in respect of jurisdiction concerns the question whether an 
arbitral award or an arbitration agreement constitutes an 'investment'. An 
investment is an allocation of resources made in cash, in kind, or in labour, 
entailing a certain duration and participation in the risks associated with the 
economic operation. Even where BITs have broad definitions covering 'any kind of 
asset' followed by an enumerative list, it is difficult to see how an arbitration 
agreement or an arbitral award could be an investment. Cases have rather held 
Whik Industries, sec. 14. 
Ibid., para. 14.2.1. 
Ibid., para. 14.1.1. 
Bid., para. 14.2.2. During the course of the oral hearing (against the possibility of a finding of BIT breach by 
India), the Tribunal asked the parties whether they considered that it was in a position, without further 
evidence or submissions, to determine whether the Award was enforceable in India. The parties agreed that 
sufficient material had been provided to the Tribunal to enable it to undertake this task, if it arose, and that 
it should determine the question in that event. 
Ibid., paras. 14.2.35-14.2.45. 
Ibid., paras. 14.2.46-14.2.56. 
Ibid., paras. 14.2.57-14.2.64. 
Ibid., para. 14.2.65. 
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that the investment comprises of the contribution made in the course of the 
underlying transaction that gave rise to the dispute and to the award. This view 
was adopted in Saipem,83 in Frontier,84 and in Romak.85 
The tribunal in White Industries believed to have identified a 'developing 
jurisprudence on the treatment of arbitral awards to the effect that 'awards made 
by tribunals arising out of disputes concerning "investments"... under BITs 
represent a continuation or transformation of the original investment'.86 If the 
underlying transaction meets the definition of investment (this was not the case, for 
instance, in Romak87), then the fact that the rights flowing from the investment later 
crystallized in an arbitral award does not mean they have vanished altogether, and 
that they should be denied protection under the BIT. This does not mean, 
however, that the award is an investment in and of itself. 
In the context of the definition of investment, one should add that the national 
courts whose decision is at issue must be a court of the host state of the investment, 
that is the state where the investment (in terms of original allocation of resources) 
was made. If a state fails to enforce a foreign arbitral award concerning a dispute 
arising out of an investment made in a third country, then the BIT jurisdictional 
requirement that the dispute concern an investment could hardly be met absent a 
territorial nexus between the original investment and the putative respondent 
state.88 
(b) Questions of Merits - Has there been an Abuse of Rights? 
If the jurisdictional hurdle is passed, the question arises as to what test should be 
employed by the arbitral tribunal to assess whether the national courts' conduct 
amounts to a violation of the BIT To answer this question, one should distinguish 
whether the national courts' decision calls the New York Convention into play (2.1) 
or not (2.2). 
Saipem Jurisdiction, para. 110 ('for the purpose of determining whether there is an investment under Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention, [the arbitral tribunal] will consider the entire operation. In the present case, the 
entire or overall operation includes the Contract, the construction itself, the Retention Money, the warranty 
and the related ICC Arbitration', internal footnotes omitted). See also ibid., paras. 125-128. 
Frontier Petroleum, para. 231. 
Romak, para. 211 ('the GAFTA Award is so inextricably linked to the Romaic Supply Agreement that any 
determination as to whether Romak holds and investment under the BIT cannot be made without reference 
to the entire economic transaction that is the subject of these arbitral proceedings. The GAFTA Award 
merely constitutes the embodiment of Romak's contractual rights (as determined by the GAFTA Arbitral 
Tribunal) stemming from the wheat supply transaction entered into by Romak. If the underlying transaction 
is not an investment within the meaning of the BIT, the mere embodiment or crystallization of rights arising 
thereunder in an arbitral award cannot transform it into an investment' (internal footnotes omitted). 
White Industries, para. 7.6.8 (internal footnotes omitted). 
Romak, paras. 209-243. See also GEA, paras. 154—164 (the commercial arbitral award arose out of a 
'settlement agreement' and a 'repayment agreement', none of which the tribunal found to constitute an 
investment). 
See William W. Park, Respecting the New York Convention, 18 ICC Intl. Ct. Arb. Bull. 1, 4 (2007). 
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(i) Abusive Application of the New York Convention 
In the first scenario, an award creditor complains of the failure by the domestic 
courts to enforce a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention or - in 
what appears a rare occurrence — the award debtor complains of the enforcement 
of the award, such as in Kaliningrad. A first question which arises relates to the 
interplay between the two treaties which are at issue here, i.e., the BIT which 
confers jurisdiction on the investment tribunal, and the New York Convention, 
which represents the standard under which the national court has acted. 
The issue of the interplay between the two treaties is not theoretical. It appears 
to have arisen and to have been discussed in Kaliningrad and in the ensuing decision 
of the Paris Court of Appeals on the challenge of the award.89 The discussion 
focused on the ways to reconcile the provisions of the BIT with those of the New 
York Convention90 in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).91 
The latter does provide some conflict rules. Unfortunately however, these rules 
do not seem helpful in this type of scenario. It appears difficult to invoke Article 30 
VCLT (dealing with 'successive treaties relating to the same subject matter'), given 
that a treaty dealing with the recognition and enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and arbitral awards (i.e., the New York Convention) has a different 
subject matter than a treaty aimed at promoting and protecting foreign investment 
(i.e., the BIT). Similarly, recourse to Article 41 VCLT which addresses 'agreements 
to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only', appears 
untenable. One can hardly argue that the later BIT has been concluded with the 
intention of modifying the New York Convention between the two BIT contracting 
states, which would be necessary for the application of Article 41 VCLT.92 Yet, this 
argument was apparently made in the Kaliningrad and discussed in the decision of 
the Paris Court of Appeals.93 
It is submitted that a more helpful rule in this context is Article 26 VCLT, which 
provides that '[ejvery treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith'. Authoritative commentary notes that the 
principle of good faith enshrined in Article 26 encompasses the narrower doctrine 
Government of the Kaliningrad Region v. Republic of Lithuania, Paris Court of Appeals, Decision of 18 Nov. 2010, pp. 
3-6 (see supra n. 72). 
See ibid., pp. 3—6. There is no conflict of treaty rule within the two treaties which could be of help in this kind 
of situation. Art. VII of the New York Convention contains a conflict rule, which is not relevant for these 
purposes. It is unlikely that a BIT will provide a conflict rule. 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
Art. 41(2) VCLT requires the parties to the bilateral treaty to notify the other parties of their intention to 
conclude the agreement and of the modification to the treaty for which it provides (on which Mark E. 
Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 534-535 (2009)). See also Fragmentation of 
International law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of International Law, Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 
13 Apr. 2006, para. 317 (for the opinion that, absent such notification, the intention to modify the previous 
multilateral agreement must be 'universally apparent from the object of the inter se agreement'). 
See Government of the Kaliningrad Region v. Republic ofLithuania, Paris Court of Appeals, Decision of 18 Nov. 2010, 
esp. pp. 5-6. 
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of'abuse of rights'.94 The doctrine of abuse of rights is generally understood to 
refer to 'the exercise of a right for an end different from that for which the right was 
created, to the injury of another person or the community'.95 Article 26 ensures 
that parties to a treaty shall abstain from acts calculated to frustrate the object and 
purpose and thus impede the proper execution of the treaty, and applies, in 
particular, where a treaty leaves states a large discretion.96 
The place of the abuse of right doctrine in international law is not entirely 
clear.97 According to the oft-cited sentence by Hersch Lauterpacht, '[tjhere is no 
right, however well established, which could not, in some circumstances, be refused 
recognition on the ground that it has been abused'.98 Some have argued that a 
review of decisions of international courts and tribunals and the practice of a 
number of states would warrant the conclusion that the principle of abuse of rights 
constitutes a general principle of law under Article 38(i)(c) of the Statute of the 
ICJ.99 In fact, the principle was relied on by the PCIJ and the ICJ on several 
occasions.100 The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Appellate Body, has formulated the principle as follows: 
[The principle of good faith], at once a general principle of law and a general principle of 
international law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this general 
principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive 
exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right "impinges on die field 
covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, mat is to say, reasonably." An 
abusive exercise by a Member of its own treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights 
of the other Members and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member so acting.101 
Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 367 (2009) (internal footnotes 
omitted). 
B.O. Iluyomade, The Scope and Content of a Complaint of Abuse of Right in International Law, 16 Harv. Intl. LJ. 47, 
48 (1975). 
Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 367 (2009). See, e.g., La Bretagne 
case between France and Canada, where the Arbitral Tribunal spoke of'the principle of good faith, which, 
according to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, necessarily governs the 
performance of treaties, as affording a sufficient guarantee against any risk of the French Party exercising its 
rights abusively, Filleting within the Gulf of St. Lawrence between Canada and France, Award, 17 Jul. 1986, RIAA, vol. 
XIX, pp. 225-296, at 241-242, para. 27 (emphasis added). For a treaty explicitly recognizing die 
prohibition of abuse of rights, see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 
10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, 21 ILM 1261 (entered into force 16 Nov. 1994), Art. 300. 
See Alexandre Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (R. Wolfrum ed.,) 
(available at www.mpepil.com). 
Hersch Lauterpacht, Development of International Law by the International Court 164 (Stevens & Sons, 1958), 
quoted in Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 9 Apr. 2009, para. 107, and 
Mobil Corp. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
lOJun. 2010, para. 172. 
B.O. Iluyomade, The Scope and Content of a Complaint of Abuse of Right in International Law, 16 Harv. Intl. LJ. 47, 
72-73 (1975). 
See Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland) (Merits), PCIJ, 1926, Series 
A. No. 7, at 30, 37-38; Case of the Free £ones of Upper Savoy and the District ofGex (France v. Switzerland), PCIJ> 
1932), Series A/B, No. 46, at 167 ;Angb-Norwegian Fisheries Case (UnitedKingdom v. Norway), 1951 ICJ Rep. 116, 
at 141-142. See also Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age, 47 Mcgill LJ. 389, 399-400 
(2002). 
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 158 (internal footnotes omitted). 
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The principle is also well-established in investment arbitration, where on several 
occasions, it has been relied on as a bar to investors' rights.102 
Regarding the specific issue addressed in this contribution, certain tribunals 
have also resorted to the concept of abuse of rights as a tool for evaluating the state 
conduct at stake. The tribunal in Saipem, after analysing the Bangladeshi courts' 
conduct relating to the ICC arbitration, concluded that: 
[ . . . ] the Bangladeshi courts abused their supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration process. It 
is true that the revocation of an arbitrator's authority can legitimately be ordered in case of 
misconduct. It is further true that in making such order national courts do have substantial 
discretion. However, they cannot use their jurisdiction to revoke arbitrators for reasons wholly 
unrelated with such misconduct and the risks it carries for the fair resolution of the dispute. Taken 
together, the standard for revocation used by the Bangladesh courts and the manner in which the 
judge applied that standard to the facts indeed constituted an abuse of right.103 
In Frontier Petroleum, the claimant made the argument that the failure by the host 
state to enforce an arbitral award under the terms of the New York Convention 
constituted a breach of the international principle of good faith, reflected in Article 
26 of the VCLT,104 and an abuse of right.105 The tribunal examined whether the 
Czech courts' conduct - refusing to enforce the award for reasons of public policy 
— could amount to an abuse of rights, thus impliedly confirming that it shared the 
view that this doctrine has a role to play in the review of a state's discretion in 
application of the New York Convention.106 In the end, the Tribunal found that no 
abuse had been committed. It noted that states enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation in determining what their own conception of international public 
policy is. To exclude a violation of the BIT, it was sufficient for the tribunal to find 
that the courts' interpretation of the public policy exception was 'plausible', 
'reasonably tenable' and 'made in good faith'.107 Thus, under the Frontier standard, 
a violation would only occur if the court's decision is 'untenable', which is a very 
different standard from saying that the decision is simply wrong. The threshold 
See Saluka Investments BVv. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL/PCA, Partial Award, 17 Mar. 2006, paras. 235-236; 
Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 9 Apr. 2009, paras. 107, 143-144; 
Mobil Corp. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
lOJun. 2010, paras. 167-185; Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Interim 
Award, 1 Dec. 2008, para. 143 (adopting a rather cautious approach to the issue); Abaclat and others v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 Aug. 2011, paras. 
642-658. 
Saipem Merits, para. 159. See also ibid., para. 161 (the Bangladeshi courts exercised their supervisory 
jurisdiction for an end which was different from that for which it was instituted and thus violated the 
internationally accepted principle of prohibition of abuse of rights). 
Frontier, para. 471. 
Ibid., para. 472. 
Ibid., para. 525 (noting that '[t]he Tribunal's role under this claim is to determine whether the refusal of me 
Czech courts to recognise and enforce the Final Award in full violates Article 111(1) of the BIT. In order to 
answer this question, the Tribunal must ask whether the Czech courts' refusal amounts to an abuse of rights contrary to the 
international principle of good faith, i.e. was the interpretation given by the Czech courts to the public policy 
exception in Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention made in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner or 
did it otherwise amount to a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard', emphasis added). 
Ibid., para. 527. 
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required for the court's conduct to amount to a treaty breach in this case (similarly 
to the standard of abuse) is much higher than a mere error in the decision. 
Similarly, as above, the tribunal in GEA found that the underlying transaction 
(and the ICC award arising out of it) was not an 'investment' (see supra at II.2.3), 
and thus denied jurisdiction over the claim. However, it observed that, even if 
arguendo there was an investment, there was no 'egregious' conduct which would 
justify a finding of treaty breach. Thus, without resorting explicidy to the abuse of 
rights principle, the tribunal suggested a similar threshold: a simple mistake by the 
courts at the enforcement stage would not suffice to amount to a treaty breach; 
something more serious - 'egregious' - would be required. 108 
In this sense, the abuse of right principle becomes a sort of 'cross-cutting' 
concept which may be employed when applying the standards of treatment of the 
investment treaty (fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, denial of justice, 
etc.). Sometimes, the principle of abuse of right in the application of the New York 
Convention may coincide with the investment treaty standard (for instance when 
the treaty prohibits arbitrary or discriminatory conduct or denial of justice). Where 
there is no such coincidence (for example regarding a claim of expropriation), the 
principle of abuse of right will serve as a tool which, in the application of the treaty 
standard, will help qualify that particular state conduct relating to the 
(mis)application of the New York Convention. 
(ii) Abusive Application of National Arbitration Law 
Misconduct by domestic courts may also occur outside the New York Convention 
framework, when domestic courts apply domestic arbitration legislation. For 
example, courts may apply domestic arbitral legislations in annulment 
proceedings. An award creditor may see its validly issued commercial arbitral 
award unlawfully set aside by the host state courts, and may thus attempt to turn 
to investment treaty arbitration for justice. 
The framework is different from a situation involving the New York Convention, 
where the contracting state is bound by the grounds for non-enforcement (subject 
to a margin of discretion in the interpretation of certain concepts, especially the 
public policy exception). In the field of annulment, the discretion of states and their 
judiciary is wider. Each state enjoys sovereignty in deciding what its own measure 
of review of arbitral awards ought to be. While today most states (especially those 
which have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law) have ensured that the grounds 
for annulment parallel those for non-enforcement of the award set forth in the 
New York Convention, others still provide broader room for court review at the 
annulment stage, which in certain instances even addresses the merits of the 
award.109 
While one may take issue, from a policy point of view, with an excessively 
intrusive review of arbitral awards, such an attitude per se is not subject to scrutiny 
See GEA v. Ukraine, paras. 236, 319. 
See Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration 2553, 2636-2657 (2009). 
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by any international court or tribunal. Thus, if parties choose a seat for their 
arbitration in a country which provides for idiosyncratic grounds of annulment, 
the application of such grounds by the courts at a later stage will not be able to 
trigger any condemnation by an investment tribunal. However, if the courts at the 
seat abuse their powers in connection to annulment actions, i.e., their action 
appears not simply wrong but egregious or not reasonably tenable, the aggrieved 
party may have a claim under an investment treaty. 
An obiter dictum in ATA seems to confirm this approach. As observed above, 
the Jordanian courts had applied an unusual rule present in the national 
arbitration law, whereby the annulment of an award entailed the extinguishment 
of the underlying arbitration agreement. While the investment tribunal said it was 
taking no position on this point,110 it suggested that had the rule existed at the time 
the arbitration agreement was signed, an aggrieved party would be barred from 
raising a complaint at a later stage.111 But since the rule was enacted after the 
conclusion of the arbitration agreement and was applied retroactively, Jordan 
could not escape liability.112 One could thus say that by applying the rule 
retroactively (the prohibition of retroactivity arguably also being a general 
principle of law), Jordan, through its courts, had violated the prohibition of abuse 
of rights. The operation of the principle of abuse of rights is therefore no different 
and no less important in situations involving national arbitral legislation than it is 
in circumstances which call the application of the New York Convention into play. 
IV. C O N C L U S I O N S 
The foregoing analysis of the fact patterns and legal issues brings us back to the 
questions presented at the outset of this contribution. Do these recent 
developments challenge the traditional architecture of international commercial 
arbitration? How do they affect the current organization of international dispute 
settlement? 
Regarding the first query, the answer is affirmative. The cases show that the 
traditionally closed architecture is being opened up, modified. To what extent is it 
being modified? The answer to this question boils down to grasping the role which 
an international court or tribunal should assume when ruling on these types of 
claims. The answer calls for several observations. First, domestic courts all over the 
world routinely make decisions affecting international commercial arbitrations. 
ATA, para. 128. 
Ibid. ('It is arguable (but the Tribunal takes no position on the point) that the extinguishment rule might be 
deemed to be prospectively compatible with Article II insofar as parties electing Jordan as the venue for an 
arbitration or electing Jordanian law as the law of the arbitration had notice of the rule and accepted it'). 
Ibid. ( ' . . . this argument cannot work retroactively. Retroactivity is the problem here. The new rule should 
cover only those arbitration agreements concluded after the coming into force of the Jordanian Arbitration 
Law in 2001 and not arbitration agreements existing before the 2001 Law came into force, such as the 
Arbitration Agreement at issue in this proceeding. In the Tribunal's view, the Jordanian Court of Appeal 
and Court of Cassation could have complied with their duty in this case by refusing to apply retroactively 
the new rule introduced in the last sentence of Article 51 of the Jordanian Arbitration Law'). 
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Second, it lies within human nature that courts, when making decisions on 
international commercial arbitration matters, may make mistakes. Third, far from 
having achieved complete autonomy from national legal orders, the current design 
of international commercial arbitration is still characterized by the important role 
played by national law and domestic courts. States enjoy broad powers in enacting 
and applying national legislation and in organizing mechanisms for the review of 
judicial decisions. They also enjoy certain discretion in interpreting the New York 
Convention.113 As a result, the idea that a party dissatisfied with any domestic 
court decision would have automatic access to an international court or tribunal 
must be dismissed.114 However, when the national court's mistake reaches the 
threshold of an egregious misconduct, then access to an international dispute 
resolution body may be open.115 
In the context of investment arbitration, it is submitted that the principle of 
abuse of rights deriving from the duty of good faith may provide guidance to an 
international court or tribunal when evaluating whether the allegations made by 
the aggrieved party amount to a treaty breach. 
With respect to the second query about a possible challenge to the overall 
organization of international dispute settlement as a whole, the developments of 
these last few years seem to show that bridges and connections are being built 
between certain fragmented pieces of the overall system. Can one speak of 
defragmentation? Of the rise of an integrated system of international dispute 
settlement? It may be premature to venture an answer to these questions. The 
cases are still modest in number, and it remains to be seen whether they signal the 
emergence of a permanent phenomenon. What is clear is that the world of 
international dispute setdement is evolving, and that this evolution deserves our 
continued attention in the years to come. 
One may agree with William W. Park that 'much judicial failure to respect the [New York] Convention will 
likely remain without practical sanction'. William W. Park, Respecting the Mew York Convention, 18(2) ICC Intl. 
Ct.Arb. Bull. 1, 13(2007). 
See also the observations made by the arbitral tribunals in Romak, para. 186, and in Saipem Merits, paras. 133, 
187. 
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